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Market Imperfection:
Credit Rationing and Excess Liquidity
Abstract
This article seeks to understand how the monetary policy facilitates credit
channels such as credit growth, credit creation and investment spreads . A
major task is tackling asymmetric information in credit markets. A decline
in wealth transfer from the lender to the borrower which raises the adverse
selection problem, thus leads to decreased lending and finance investment
spending. The simulation with two representative countries provides us with
detailed evidence on savings and investment expressing supply and demand
of loanable funds at the economic level; but this is largely ignored in the
conventional macroeconomic analysis: e.g. in the Arrow-Debreu model, firms
can fund all projects on a pay-as-you-go basis. Further investigation will be
conducted for the lender as the principal how to face a low interest rate
environment.
JEL classification: E22, E32, E52
Keywords: credit rationing, fixed investment scale, excess liquidity, low
interest rate.
1. Introduction
Credit rationing matters to the market imperfection. There are several
arguments to define credit rationing. Firstly, which one is “rationed?” Gen-
erally speaking, the market situation is “rationed” when the excess demand
for loans in the market is greater than the supply of loans, e.g. Jaffee and
Modigliani (1969). By the way, this is not so clear with changes in the inter-
est rate. The reason is that if the interest rate changes, it implies that some
receive a loan and others do not. Possibly, the rejected borrower is willing
to pay a higher interest rate, e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Hence, some
borrowers are completely “rationed” out of the market.
Secondly, does credit rationing play an role in the monetary transmission?
The low interest environment suggests that banks are not lending much. It
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doesn’t shortly conclude that loan pricing is sufficiently changing to changes
of credit. There is no evidence that poor credit demand is rationed out of
non-prime borrowers. Hence, the further investigation is needed how the
credit channel works.
Why would companies, banks and the government not be able to meet their
liquidity needs in international markets? Foreign investments and foreign
debts have to be paid with the country’s tradable income. The limit in the
market to transfer the wealth is not as a whole to be traded with the in-
surance. Aggregate liquidity shortage shows the international credit supply
as the last resort such as the model of a country’s international collateral
and its domestic collateral in Caballero-Krishnamurthy (2001, 2002, 2003
a,b). It possibly has another reason that there may be the friction in the
enforcement mechanism by domestic government policy because of scarcity
of international collateral in Holmstrom-Tirole (1996).
Sequential loan claims have the accelerator effect in economics. That is, an
economic boom implies more machinery called fixed investment. This goes
in the other way. Falling GDP discourages fixed investment. To measure the
accelerator effect, one driver can be excess liquidity defined as excess cash
1 plus excess reserves. Excluded from excess liquidity, required reserves has
the money multiplier effect on demand deposits.
Related to the international market, required reserves are inside liquidity -
within the international market, otherwise excess liquidity has outside liq-
uidity - mainly within the domestic economy. If cashflows into the banking
system persistently exceed from the market by the central bank, that is sur-
plus liquidity within the international market. However, the comparison of
two countries is more accurate with the concept of excess liquidity than sur-
plus liquidity since the cost of the international market is not aggregated.
The goal of this project is to model institutional decisions of lending and
hence analyze the impact of measures taken to promote investment for house-
holds and firms and insure the precautionary amount of reserves in banks.
Specifically, the research aims to:
• Develop a tractable model of investment behaviors at the country level
with the banking sector, capturing of credit rationing and the risky
nature of investment for lenders.
• Build compound probability models, calibrated to two representative
1Practically, the cause of excess liquidity is rarely only from excess cash.
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villages incorporating the impact of credit rationing on monetary trans-
mission mechanism and growth; hence support better macroeconomic
and microeconomic policy analysis.
The reason to start with two countries is to compare the risk appetite whether
the country prefers to have precautionary liquidity or not. How many banks
or countries are efficient to say in this framework? Actually, for the policy
implication, the number of the national bank is 0% among total banks. For
example, in the European Central Bank (ECB) data of the euro area mon-
etary aggregates, the number of national central bank is 20 among 5,286
monetary financial institutions (MFIs) at the end of May 2019 (The calcu-
lation is simply done such as 20 ÷ 5, 286 = 0.00378). When it comes to
loan claims by countries or central banks, the risk appetite is not compa-
rable with one of commercial banks since the risk acceptance level such as
bankruptcy is significantly reduced at the country level. Empirically, there
is a debate between monetary policy changes and significant movements.
Significant movements can be aggregate bank lending volume in Bernanke
and Blinder (1992) such as the following model in this article or liquidity
of smaller banks, i.e. the bottom 95 percent of the size distribution such as
Kashyap and Stein (2000).
For the balance match, the bank-level data ought to be explicable in the
monetary transmission. In the same sense, Jiménez et al (2012) argue this
omitted variable problem in the temporary fall of loan demand. The reason
can be that data are depending only on macro data in Bernanke and Blinder
(1992) or bank-level data in Kashyap and Stein (2000).
In addition by Jiménez et al (2012), separating the effect of monetary con-
ditions from economic activity is problematic because of a Taylor rule -
determined short-term interest rate changes. Hence, we need to adopt the
monetary condition separated from economic activity. Credit rationing is
useful to check the precautionary aim of loan opportunities in excess loan de-
mand. This situation is depicted in numerous literature as the funding value
adjustment in Andersen, Duffie and Song (2016). In the economic cycle,
credit rationing is explained as an instrument such that if an interest ceiling
is sufficiently high, then it discourages demand and conserve their assets up
to demand equivalent to zero in Jaffee-Modigliani (1969) and Stiglitz-Weiss
(1981). However, on the other hand, it doesn’t have the economic value at
the Nash equilibrium since no credit rationing may be the first-best optimum
investment or low investment which is the first-best case for everybody in
Piketty (1997).
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2. The Basic Model
The model has two types of agents: a credit-rationed country, a non-
credit-rationed country and the principal as the international lender. There
are ten periods after the post-crisis period. In the first period, the loan con-
tract is signed between an agent and the principal. From the second period,
the principal wants to evaluate whether additional loan claims are accept-
able. Two agents are risk-neutral with a non-negative liquidity position.
2.1. The Banking Sector
There is a continuum of banks. There are two indices of credit rationing.
One is a “demand deposit index”, which measures by how much demand
deposits are larger than total reserves; the other is a “required reserve in-
dex”, which measures ratios of excess reserves to required reserves or total
reserves. The underlying assumption is that as banks hold more liquidity,
they increase credit supply and are less likely to be credit-rationed.
For simplicity, we design the first-period inside money assumption. In detail,
the aggregate amount of bank capital is required to be reserved equal to or
greater than the money multiplier amount in the market. The first-period
inside money in the loan market can be the loan market value M. The distri-
bution of inside money across banks has the money multiplier m such as 1/m
M. The optimal capital value K is credit-rationed by a reserve requirement
rr, 1/m×M × rr = K.
Each country has different demand deposits DD. In a country, withdrawals
of demand deposits DD are costly to be liquid in a period 1.
2.2. An international lender
The lender is big such as the international financial institution. I refer it
as the uninformed principal who monitors the liquidity position and offers the
loan contract. If DD > R, the optimal capital value K is reduced than the
optimum. The contraction of credit supply is considered as credit rationing
DD−R. If DD < R, the optimal capital value K is over than the optimum.
The bank intends to save the precautionary fund R−DD.
A. Interest Rate Channel
The interest rate channel is the standard Keynesian channel of monetary
transmission. A fall in real interest rates lowers the cost of capital and boosts
investment spending. What if the low interest rate cannot imbue the rise of
investment? One reason can be price rigidities which differently react in the
short-term horizon and the long-term one according to rational expectation.
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Holmstrom and Tirole (2013) show the fixed investment scale which is inher-
ently rationed for firms. Investment decisions depend on the continuation
of social values rather than the negative expected return. Possibly, initial
investments and continuous investments would be credit-rationed.
We assume that the principal cannot monitor the low interest rate because
they have sufficient capital to operate the international loan business. Fur-
thermore, the lack of the world driver will have not to reduce the loan con-
tract.
The low interest rate may lead to rise the aggregate output such as fixed in-
vestment, housing investment, consumer durable expenditure and inventory
investment through the interest rate channel.
3. Incorporating Credit Rationed Investment Into Macro-Financial
Decisions
The following phase of the article is analyzing macroeconomic implica-
tions of financial stability and monetary policy modeling of the basic setting.
The macroeconomic importance of market imperfection with credit rationing
is widely recognized and some have attempted to address the credit growth
and GDP. Ramcharan, Verani and Van den hovel (2016) explain shocks in
the US economy from market losses of the asset-backed securities (ABS) and
the supply of credit: new lending per year fell from an average of around 40
billions before the crisis to about -1.5 billions a year after 2008. 80 billions
in loans over 2009-2010 may depress credit demand, as the US entered into
a recession at around the same time, i.e. U.S. GDP in 14.96 trillion USD
(World Bank, 2010).
B. Credit Channels
Changes in aggregate credit are expected to persist along continuous pos-
itive investment, the negative shock causes a large gap in the expected GDP
per capital growth. For example, in the World Bank national accounts data
and OECD National Accounts, GDP per capita growth (annual %) was -
2.936% in 2009 for the world. It immediately went up to 3.104% in 2010 and
maintained from 1.301 % in 2012 to 1.977 in 2017. On the one hand, Aghion,
Angeletos, Banerjee and Manova (2010) claim credit rationing may lead to
both higher volatility and lower mean growth according to the cyclical com-
position of investment. Here, we assume that investment is not a continuous
decision but rather occasionally triggered when opportunity is given.
There are two credit channels: the bank lending channel and the balance-
sheet channel. (1) The bank lending channel shifts the supply of intermediate
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credit and screens credit-worthy agents. (2) The balance-sheet channel es-
timates the probability of financial distress. For example, the expansionary
monetary policy increases bank reserves and bank deposits - available bank
loans. The increase in loans will cause investment and consumer spending
to rise.
For (1), in the following table 3.B, the behavior of credit worthy agents is
depicted as demand deposits (DD) above reserves (R). There are two sub-
categories in which one is greater between DD and R. For (2), required
reserves (RR) are fixed per country. The financial distress is possible to be
measured by plugging excess reserves R−RR into two different criteria, the
regulated rate RR or a real banking variable R. Therefore, credit rationing
can be interpreted in two situations. Firstly, when DD is greater than R,
the possibility of bank runs is crucial to know how much savings can be with-
drawn in the worst scenario. Secondly, when DD is less than R, it may have
excess liquidity hence, checking reserves above required reserves is crucial.
The demand deposit (DD) Index
DD −R
R
DD −R
DD
The required reserve (RR) Index
R−RR
RR
R−RR
R
Table 3.B. Two Indices of Credit Rationing.
3.1. Composition of Liquidity
In an asset-liability match, demand deposits exerted a strong influence
on reserves. It suggests required reserves as a percentage of net demand
deposits for financial regulation. Demand deposits against reserves is total
demand deposits less "due from" in Allen (1956). No single explanation can
account for the single driver to describe changes of reserves according to
credit and demand deposits. However, several assumptions are worth to be
mentioned for the sake of financial regulation.
As a monetary instrument, optimal reserve requirement on demand deposits
in Siegel (1981) controls the value of monetary aggregates. It can be in a
safety reason in 1930. That is to say, holding excess liquidity can be from
various economic reasons, e.g. lack of good loan opportunities. Much compli-
cated after crisis 2007, good loan opportunities hinge on a series of remedies
in a bad economic situation up to one country and more. Excess liquidity
passively accumulated is not merely explained by the conservatism of frac-
tional banking system. For proper loan commitment, it is no less dubious
6
that holding excess liquidity is a good reason to show credit facility. The
bank transparency induces good loan opportunities and obtains safer invest-
ment returns by overnight interests. It requires a quite logical explanation
of reserves in several countries.
At the heart of credit rationing lies the conception of the liquidity compo-
sition. Let’s assume that there are two villages whose excess liquidities are
different.
(Current USD, million) Village I Village II
Outside Liquidity in domestic currency, liabilities
currency issued 2,027 400
required reserves 183 4500
excess reserves 2 400 14,150
reserve money 2,610 15,000
demand deposits, commercial banks 3,400 1,000
excess liquidity R < DD DD < R
Inside Liquidity
overnight deposit window rate 2.75 2.75
domestic credit to private sector by banks to GDP (%) 70 99.2
net commercial bank lending and other private credits 250 -43
Table 3.1.1. Selected Liquid Characteristics of Village I and Village II
As a first step in the above table 3.1.1, the total reserve ratio has strong over-
tones of non-required reserve holdings. Two different reserve requirements
7% in village I and 30% in village II bear uniformed non-required reserve
holdings during simulated 10 years as of 93% = 100%− 7% in village I and
70% = 100% − 30% in village II. The comparison of only different reserve
requirements may not offer the clearest proof for precautionary holdings of
excess reserves.
7 %
Village I R DD RR RR/DD R-RR (R-RR) ÷ R (R-RR) ÷ RR (DD-R) ÷ DD
Year 1 2610 3400 183 5 % 2427 93 % 1326 % 23 %
30 %
Village II R DD RR RR/DD R-RR (R-RR) ÷ R (R-RR) ÷ RR (DD-R) ÷ R
Year 1 15000 1000 4500 450 % 10500 70 % 233 % -93 %
Table 3.1.2 The liquidity composition in the Village I and Village II 3
It carries the total reserve ratio omitted in the analysis of required reserves.
Even if the attention on "RR/DD" is regulated at same lower rate as of 5%,
3identification symbols: DD (Demand Deposits), RR (Required Reserves), R (Reserves)
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how can we interpret the fluctuation of the ratio (DD-R) ÷ DD varies? I lay
heavy alert that this reserve ratio analysis should not be partial only by the
reserve ratio.
3.2. Reserve choices and liquidity controls
The methodology to measure a reserve requirement in Eurozone is more
complex according to policy rules after Eurozone cuts as of 1% in 2012 from
2%. Given the fact that almost all financial requirement on reserves in Eu-
rozone countries are uniformly implemented by same redlining. This is not
hardly surprising when we look up constraints of each country’s loan acces-
sibility.
However, it is still expected to be effective as a policy instrument. For ex-
ample, China cuts bank reserves as of 17.00 % again to counter slowdown as
of 29 February 2016.
In the following table 3.2, village I has excess reserves than required reserves
(400 > 183). Currency issued is mostly a dummy variable in many cases of
excess liquidity. Likewise, the empirical evidence is not enough that excess
cash entirely causes excess liquidity. It merely implies the case of excess liq-
uidity is able to have excess cash. Additionally, village II has excess reserves
than required reserves (14150 > 4500). In brief, credit rationing of village
I is positive as of 790. On the other hand, credit rationing of village II is
negative as of -14000. Therefore, the contraction of loan demand is greater
in village I than one in village II.
Village and Credit Rationing Excess Liquidity Inside Liquidity
Liquidity I : DD-R I: (R-RR) ÷ R I: (DD-R) ÷ DD
Composition II: -(R-DD) II: (R-RR) ÷ RR II: (DD-R) ÷ R
Village Village I, II Village I, II Village I , II
currency issued 2027, 400
required reserves 183, 4500
reserve ratio 7%, 30%
excess reserves 400, 14150
reserve money 2610, 15000
demand deposits 3400, 1000
credit rationing 790, -14000
93 %, 233 %
23%, -93 %
Table 3.2. The Precautionary Level in Liquidity Composition4
4identification symbols: DD (Demand Deposits), R (Reserves), RR (Required Reserves)
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C. Equity Price Channel
Building an explanatory model with two countries, the credit rationing
model is useful to measure both aggregate credit and GDP. The simulation
is to calibrate against various features of financial shocks. Therefore, the
systematic response to the emergence of future shocks is presented with a
slowing-down point. The result will offer a clear and comprehensive overview
of key measures before and after redlining of debts which is applicable in the
country level. This will be undertaken in two stages, first a relatively mea-
sured chart about money composition that captures key liquidity figures;
second a more detailed analysis calibrated to the large amount of data avail-
able on credit growth and GDP.
Village I
7 %
YEAR R DD RR RR/DD R-RR (R-RR) ÷ R (R-RR) ÷ RR (DD-R) ÷ DD
1 2610 3400 183 5 % 2427 93 % 1329 % 23 %
2 2650 3500 186 5 % 2465 93 % 1329 % 24 %
3 2690 3600 188 5% 2502 93 % 1329 % 25 %
4 2730 3700 191 5% 2539 93 % 1329 % 26 %
5 2770 3800 194 5% 2576 93 % 1329 % 27 %
6 2810 3900 197 5% 2613 93 % 1329 % 28 %
7 2850 4000 200 5% 2651 93 % 1329 % 29 %
8 2890 4100 202 5% 2688 93 % 1329 % 30 %
9 2930 4200 205 5% 2725 93 % 1329 % 30 %
10 2970 4300 208 5% 2762 93 % 1329 % 31 %
Village II
30 %
YEAR R DD RR RR/DD R-RR (R-RR) ÷ R (R-RR) ÷ RR (DD-R) ÷ R
1 15000 1000 4500 450 % 10500 70 % 233 % -93 %
2 15000 1100 4500 409 % 10500 70 % 233 % -93 %
3 15000 1200 4500 375 % 10500 70 % 233 % -92 %
4 15000 1300 4500 346 % 10500 70 % 233 % -91 %
5 15000 1400 4500 321 % 10500 70 % 233 % -91 %
6 15000 1500 4500 300 % 10500 70 % 233 % -90 %
7 15000 1600 4500 281 % 10500 70 % 233 % -89 %
8 15000 1700 4500 265 % 10500 70 % 233 % -89 %
9 15000 1800 4500 250 % 10500 70 % 233 % -88 %
10 15000 1900 4500 237 % 10500 70 % 233 % -87 %
Table 3.C.1. The liquidity composition in Village I and Village II 5
In the above table 3.C.1, the demand deposit index in village I is posi-
tively increasing such as 23% to 31% during 10 periods. On the other hand,
the demand deposit index in village II is negatively decreasing such as -93%
5identification symbols: DD (Demand Deposits), RR (Required Reserves), R (Reserves)
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to -87% during 10 periods. What we get from this table 3.C.1 is, in village II,
the ratio "RR/DD" fulfills a pledge-able reserve level which has negative in
(DD−R)÷R. On the contrary, in village I, even though non-required reserve
ratio (R-RR)÷ R is stabilized as of 93%, the investment scale (DD−R)÷DD
increases. There is the possibility that the domestic credit to GDP is so high
that lending was not needed in village II. Remark that the following table
3.C.2 is about domestic credit to GDP and lending. Comparably, lending
is higher in village I than village II. Hence, credit rationing is well-going in
village II but credit rationing in village I should be regulated by the principal.
(Current USD, million) Village I Village II
Inside Liquidity
overnight deposit window rate 2.75 2.75
domestic credit to private sector by banks to GDP (%) 70 99.2
net commercial bank lending and other private credits 250 -43
Table 3.C.2. Selected Liquid Characteristics of Village I and Village II
4. Conclusion: The Impact of untightening credits.
Recognizing credit needs and constraints is important across the eco-
nomic population and along the healthy life-cycle of firms and households.
Untightening credits may support the facility of financing sources. The lack
of appropriate forms of finance is limiting loan entry, no measurement in
advance and renegotiation enforcement at the country level. By removing
supply-side hurdles, such as the overall opacity of the credit market, the
awareness may promote sources by this article.
The first objective of this article was to address the question about the con-
traction of loan demand: do decreased lending imply the contraction of loan
demand? Two different measures of loan demand were obtained for contin-
uous investment categorized into two stages according to precautionary and
risk-loving levels. The investment in the credit channel of the transmission
mechanism here is of particular importance. Investment is relevant to an
interest ceiling constraint which is the specific loan model for banks. We
were trying to describe investment for the country-level decision by the in-
ternational lender in the transmission mechanism.
As the numerical simulation of two countries shows, even though no transac-
tion fee for getting loans do not precise the international monetary market,
the result can eventually specify key variables and effects of the low interest
environment. When considering possibilities and policies of loans that would
10
generalize the situation for decision-making of the international lender, we
need to compare two countries. A credit-rationing country may have excess
liquidity as excess reserves.
We can therefore assume that inside liquidity, supposed to be in the market,
may have less money than a credit-rationed country. Not all cases of excess
liquidity involve the loan claim as we suggested here. If the credit-rationed
country proclaims the liquidity position for loan requests, we try to demon-
strate the mostly argued case such that domestic credit to GDP of village I
is less than the one of village II and net lending of village I is greater than
village II. In the institutional aim, the international lender need enough sim-
plicity to answer why lending is not directly affecting to domestic credit to
GDP. The key to answer this is the liquidity position: (1) positive liquidity
increases and (2) negative liquidity decreases.
Thus, the monetary policy of the low interest environment intends to de-
crease the contraction of loan supply and increase the growth of investment.
In conclusion, the importance to understand the liquidity position is crucial
to explore new ideas about potential monetary policy and lending.
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